The Facts:
The Complainant, Nokia Corporation, is an internationally-known manufacturer of mobile telephones and other telecommunications products. The Complainant's history dates back to 1865, and the Nokia name has been used in relation to telecommunications since the 1980's. The Complainant evidently has a large number (reportedly over 300) of trade mark registrations throughout the world for the word NOKIA or for marks in which the NOKIA is the dominant distinctive element. These include, inter alia, UK, European Community and US Trade Mark registrations for NOKIA (with and without a device element) and for NOKIA - CONNECTING PEOPLE, the marks being registered in a number of classes. The earliest UK registrations of NOKIA for which evidence was provided in the complaint apparently date from 1993. The UK and European Community Registrations specifically cover, amongst other things, "apparatus for the recording, transmission and reproduction of sound ..."; and "telecommunications [services]".
According to the Interbrand Annual Survey evidence appended to the Complaint, NOKIA was rated the fifth most valuable brand in the world in 2000 up from the 11th in 1999.
A Nominet WHOIS search shows that the Domain Name, nokiaringtones.co.uk, was registered on behalf of the Respondent 8th September 1999, evidently through the agency of freenetname.net.
The evidence shows that the Respondent has at some time operated a website under the url www.nokiaringtones.co.uk. The site included a front page disclaimer to the effect that:
"The website you are about to enter is not connected with Nokia Corporation or Nokia Mobile Phones Limited ("Nokia") in any way. In view of this we must stress that all of our products are of the highest quality. If you acknowledge all of these points then please feel free to enter our website. By entering our website you have acknowledged the points above."
The page otherwise provided no identification of who was actually behind the website, although the HTML page heading included, presumably for the benefit of search engines, the listing:
"Just Phones, Mobile Phones, Siemens, Ericsson, Nokia Ringtones, Nokia Fascias, Phone Accessories".
The user was invited to click on a link:
"I Agree
ENTER WEBSITE"
This link then took the visitor to a homepage of Just Phones Limited at www.justphones.co.uk/Main%20Frame.htm.
The evidence did not show when this website was first established nor when it or the Domain Name first came to the attention of the Complainant.
Discussion and Findings:
General
Paragraph 2 of the Policy requires that, for the Complainant to succeed, it must prove to the Expert, on the balance of probabilities, both that it has Rights in respect of a name or mark which is identical or similar to the Domain Name; and that the Domain Name, in the hands of the Respondent, is an Abusive Registration as defined in Paragraph 1 of the Policy.
Complainant's Rights
The Complainant in this case has asserted that it has rights in the name and mark NOKIA and that this name is identical or similar to the Domain Name.
On the basis of the evidence submitted, it is clear that the Complainant has substantial rights in the word NOKIA. It has directly relevant registered trade mark rights, which would be enforceable in the UK. In the Expert's opinion, it has also established that NOKIA is undoubtedly an internationally famous mark, which would potentially entitle it to additional legal protection on that basis.
However, the name NOKIA is not identical to the Domain Name as a whole, nor to the unique portion of the Domain Name, "nokiaringtones". It is therefore necessary to consider whether it is "similar" for the purposes of the Policy.
To an English reader, the Domain Name is readily seen as comprising the Complainant's mark, NOKIA together with the element "ringtones". The Respondent has itself admitted that this is how the Domain Name is constructed. The "ringtones" element is simply descriptive of products (i.e. "ringtones") and associated services (i.e. "supply of ringtones", whether by means of a communications network or otherwise). It is a generic term. The distinctive component of the Domain Name is the name NOKIA, which will inevitably be seen in this context for exactly what it is - a famous brand name obviously relevant to such goods or services.
From a trade mark perspective, in these circumstances, the combination "NOKIAringtones" would therefore certainly be considered as "confusingly similar" to NOKIA. The Expert sees no reason to suggest that the Policy requirement that the mark be "similar" should be construed any more narrowly.
Accordingly, for the purposes of the Policy the Expert concludes that the Complainant does have Rights in this case in respect of a name or mark, which is similar to the Domain Name.
Abusive Registration
The Complainant also has to show that the Domain Name is an Abusive Registration. Paragraph 1 of the Policy defines "Abusive Registration" as a Domain Name which either:
i. was registered or otherwise acquired in a manner, which at the time when the registration or acquisition took place, took unfair advantage of or was unfairly detrimental to the Complainant's Rights; OR
ii. has been used in a manner, which took unfair advantage of or was unfairly detrimental to the Complainant's Rights.
A non-exhaustive list of factors, which may be evidence that the Domain Name is an Abusive Registration are set out in Paragraph 3a of the Policy. The most relevant factor in the present case is as set out in Paragraph 3a(ii):
ii Circumstances indicating that the Respondent is using the Domain Name in a way which has confused people or businesses into believing that the Domain Name is registered to, operated or authorised by, or otherwise connected with the Complainant."
To be entirely consistent with this example there would need to be some evidence of actual confusion on behalf of people or businesses that the Domain Name was being used by the Respondent in a way which led them into believing that the Domain Name was connected with the Complainant. No evidence of actual confusion was presented by the Complainant.
However, the factors listed in Paragraph 3 of the Policy are only exemplary and indicative. They are not definitive. It is Paragraph 1 of the Policy, which provides the definition as indicated above.
The Complainant has not alleged specifically that the Domain Name "was registered or otherwise acquired in a manner, which at the time when the registration or acquisition took place, took unfair advantage of or was unfairly detrimental to the Complainant's Rights" (per Paragraph 1(i) of the Policy), although it has stated that the Complainant has not licensed or permitted the Respondent's use of the Domain Name. In this situation there might possibly have been a case for the Complainant to have argued that merely by registering in the Respondent's name a domain name such as the Domain Name at issue, comprising a famous and distinctive trade mark combined with a mere product description, the registration must necessarily have been made in a manner which took unfair advantage of the Complainant's Rights. This would seem to follow from the analysis applied by the Court of Appeal in the leading UK case involving domain name registrations (British Telecommunications plc and Others v. One in a Million Ltd and Others [1999] ETMR 61), where the Court stated:
"The placing on a register of a distinctive name [...] makes a representation to persons who consult the register that the registrant is connected or associated with the name registered and thus the owner of the goodwill in the name."
As the Complainant has not expressly pursued such an argument, the Expert has not considered this option any further.
The issue then is whether or not the Domain Name has been used in a manner, which took unfair advantage of or was unfairly detrimental to the Complainant's Rights (per Paragraph 1 (ii) of the Policy).
The evidence shows that the Domain Name has been used for a webpage which included a link redirecting visitors to the Respondent's own website.
The name NOKIA is used in the Domain Name in a trade mark sense. The Expert accepts the Complainant's submissions on this point. The Respondent's arguments that the use of NOKIA is merely descriptive and somehow in accordance with honest practices in such matters are entirely unconvincing. Such arguments might conceivably have had some merit if the Respondent had adopted a more realistically descriptive domain name such as "ringtones4nokiaphones.co.uk" (in the Expert's view the distinction is a fine one, and a domain name such as "ringtones4nokia.co.uk" alone would still not necessarily be considered purely descriptive). However, the Respondent did not choose such a name. They chose NOKIAringtones.co.uk because that would take most effective advantage of the reputation and goodwill established by the Complainant in the famous NOKIA name.
The Respondent then used the Domain Name in a classic "bait and switch" format. "NOKIAringtones.co.uk was the "bait" to attract interested consumers, whereupon the web page link would effect the "switch" to transfer the visitor to the Respondent's own web site.
The Respondent's Disclaimer on the web page is plainly spurious and inadequate to avoid liability for the evident misappropriation of the Complainant's goodwill and reputation which has taken place. The statement "The website you are about to enter" (on clicking on the link "ENTER WEBSITE" - see above for full text of the purported Disclaimer) would refer to the www.justphones.co.uk website in any event, and there is no indication on the www.nokiaringtones.co.uk web page of who is responsible for that page.
Whilst it may be observed that the Nominet DRS is an independent, contract-based, administrative procedure, it would be artificial in the extreme to consider it in isolation from the application of real-world rights and standards enforceable under statute. Trade Mark judgements may not be definitive for the purposes of the Policy, but they can provide sensible guidance on appropriate interpretation and the Expert believes it is appropriate to consider relevant cases on that basis.
The Respondent has alleged "serious criticism" of the applicability of the judgement of the European Court of Justice in BMW v. Deenik, Case C-63/97 to this present case. The Expert, on the contrary, considers that judgement to be highly pertinent.
In BMW v. Deenik, which was not a domain name case, but which involved consideration of the right of a trade mark owner (BMW) to prevent informative use of its mark by a dealer, the Court held that the proprietor of a trade mark was not entitled to prohibit a third party from using the mark for such informative purposes "unless the mark is used in a way that may create to the impression that there is a commercial connection between the other undertaking and the trade mark proprietor, and in particular that the reseller's business is affiliated to the trade mark proprietor's distribution network or that there is a special relationship between the two undertakings." [Emphasis added].
In the Expert's opinion, use of the NOKIA mark in a trade mark sense in the Domain Name, nokiaringtones.co.uk creates precisely the sort of impression which the ECJ allows the trade mark owner to prevent. Were the present proceedings for trade mark infringement that proviso would surely apply.
As the Respondent also itself acknowledged, in the Swedish case of Volvo Personvagnar AB v. Scandinavian Car Tuning AB, the Swedish Court also enjoined the defendant from using the domain name volvo-tuning.com, holding that such use was an infringement of Volvo's trade mark rights in the VOLVO mark.
Consequently, the Expert has no difficulty in concluding that the Domain Name has manifestly been used by the Respondent in a manner which took unfair advantage of or was unfairly detrimental to the Complainant's Rights and that it is an Abusive Registration for the purposes of the Policy.
For the record, however, the Expert notes that he does not accept the Complainant's submissions regarding the alleged offer for sale of the Domain Name. There are two reasons for this.
Firstly, the Complainant made its submissions based on a very selective and partial presentation of the relevant correspondence. In particular, the Complainant did not disclose any of its own correspondence to which it is evident that the Respondent was replying. This is clearly unsatisfactory. In the absence of full disclosure, it is not possible to determine, for example, whether or not the Complainant threatened action for trade mark infringement or whether the Complainant invited the Respondent to make some form of settlement offer. If a party wishes to rely on issues arising from inter-partes correspondence, then the Expert believes that it is incumbent on the party seeking to raise such issues to disclose all the relevant correspondence and not just to present a partial selection.
Secondly, it is in the nature of such correspondence, which was in fact between legal advisors to the parties, that it would be likely to attract, at least to some extent, "without prejudice" protection in ordinary legal proceedings. Although, as noted above, Nominet DRS proceedings are private administrative proceedings rather than ordinary legal proceedings, the Expert considers that it cannot be generally desirable to rely on evidence which might be privileged and inadmissible in a Court of Law. In the recent judgement in WH Smith Ltd v. Peter Colman [2001] FSR 9, the Court of Appeal expressed a very robust view on the circumstances in which "without prejudice" privilege might be waived, holding that:
"To fall outside the protection of the "without prejudice" rule, [a] communication had to disclose "unambiguous impropriety". The protection was not to be set aside simply because the party making the communication appeared to be putting forward an implausible or inconsistent case or to be facing an uphill struggle if the litigation continued."; and:
"In the absence of evidence of unambiguous impropriety, the defendant had to be given the doubt in negotiations which were directed towards a possible compromise."
It has been suggested that this protection should not automatically apply in Nominet's administrative proceedings. The present Expert nevertheless believes that evidence which might otherwise be privileged should still only be considered in exceptional circumstances. It is desirable that any Dispute Resolution Service should be operated in a manner which encourages the parties to settle between themselves if possible. In particular, in a case like this one, where the Complainant had the option of pursuing legal proceedings as an alternative to using the Nominet DRS, it cannot be equitable for a Respondent to be potentially subject to two distinct privilege regimes - on the one hand, if the Complainant opts for Court action, a Respondent can expect to have a settlement offer considered "without prejudice" , whereas on the other, if the Complainant opts to use the DRS, a Respondent can only be confident that a settlement offer will not be used against him if he waits for proceedings to reach the "Informal Mediation" stage. Such inconsistency cannot assist in promoting early resolution of a dispute.
These observations, however, do not change the Expert's conclusion in this case.